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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the statute. The state will benefit from an increased flow of useful testi-
mony, and the witness from greater protection from governmental
penalties.
Torts-STANDARD OF CARE-PROPERTY OWNER OWEs INVITED LICENSEE
DUTY To DISCOVER AND WARN OF HAzARDous CONDITIONS ON PREM-
IsEs.-Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973).
During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Frank Wood family in-
stalled in their front yard an underground bomb shelter that in later
years their teenaged son, Frank Layne Wood, used as his own room.
On October 7, 1969, Randall Camp, a close friend of young Wood,
visited the bomb shelter while Wood was sick in the main house. The
shelter exploded, apparently because a faulty valve had allowed pro-
pane gas to escape and accumulate. Camp suffered severe and extensive
burns, and died five days later. His father, John 0. Camp, brought a
wrongful death action against Mr. Wood and the gas company. The
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, citing the
limited duty of care a landowner owes to a social guest." The Second
District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded in an opinion which
seemed to reject the traditional categories of invitee, licensee and tres-
passer, and which seemed to hold that a landowner owes all persons
lawfully on his premises the duty of reasonable care under the circum-
stances.2 Wood petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for a writ of
1. Camp v. Gulf Counties Gas Co., 265 So. 2d 730, 731 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
2. Camp v. Gulf Counties Gas Co., 265 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972). The
test applied by Judge Mann, writing for the court, was the test originally used by Lord
Denning in Hawkins v. Caulsdon & Purley Urban Dist. Council, [1954] 1 Q.B. 319, 337
(1953): "The duty is not to invitees as a class, nor to licensees as a class, but to the very
person himself who is lawfully there. What is reasonable care in regard to him depends
on all the circumstances of the case." (Emphasis added.) A close reading of this test sug-
gests that it has no application to trespassers because they are not lawfully on the land.
While it is true that, for tort purposes, trespassers are not always distinguished from
licensees by the fact that they are unlawfully on the land, reference to the Hawkins case
clearly indicates that Lord Denning was not concerned with trespassers when he formu-
lated the test. The Hawkins case involved the licensee-invitee distinction, and it was that
distinction that Lord Denning did "not believe . . . [to be] well-founded." Id. at 30.
The Hawkins case did not consider or affect the trespasser category. It "consider[ed] simply
the law about licensees." id. at 335. Thus it is a mistake to conclude that Lord
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certiorari, which was denied." In an opinion accompanying the denial
of certiorari, however, the supreme court did expand the class of in-
vitees to include social guests4 and at the same time struck from the
opinion of the district court "all language further enlarging the rule
regarding the categories of visitors upon the premises and the degrees
of care" owed thereto.,
The Wood decision significantly modifies the traditional categoriza-
tion of persons upon the land of another, which evolved in England
during the mid-nineteenth century6 and which represents the existing
law in the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions7 The
traditional view recognizes three distinct classes: invitees, licensees and
trespassers; the landowner is deemed to owe those within each class a
separate, correlative duty of care. A trespasser is one who enters an-
other's land without consent or other privilege to do so." The land-
owner is not required to warn a trespasser of dangerous activities or
conditions; the trespasser assumes the risk of whatever he may en-
counter.9 A licensee is an individual who comes upon the land of an-
Denning's test abolished the category of trespasser. Moreover, since Denning's test is
the one Judge Mann adopted it would seem that he may not have rejected all the
traditional categories out of hand; instead, he may have merely simplified the cate-
gories. In other words, Mann may have only regrouped the traditional classes into
two categories: those lawfully upon the land of another and trespassers. The application
of Denning's standard to the facts in Camp is a further indication that the "reasonable
care under the circumstances" test was only extended to those lawfully on the property of
the landowner. Judge Mann stated that the members of the jury "are fit judges of the
question whether the host acted reasonably, in all circumstances, toward Randall Camp."
265 So. 2d at 731-32 (emphasis added). Reference to the landowner by the term "host"
implies that Judge Mann was not concerned with the landowner-trespasser relationship.
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court read the Second District opinion "to remove all
distinctions of standing and degrees of care involving trespassers, licensees and invitees
upon a property owner's premises." Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. 1973). This
reading of Judge Mann's opinion seems to be an unnecessary and perhaps incorrect ex-
tention of the holding in Camp. Furthermore, the supreme court's rejection of Camp
seems to be in large part the result of the court's concern that the Second District had
abolished the category of trespasser, id. at 693-94; in fact, Camp does not seem to go that
far. It is true that Judge Mann observed a move "toward imposing on owners and oc-
cupiers a single duty of reasonable care in all the circumstances." 265 So. 2d at 731. Never-
theless, the move Mann observed is not the test he adopted and applied. See id. at 731-32.
3. Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 697 (Fla. 1973).
4. Id. at 694-95.
5. Id. at 697.
6. See Latham v. R. Johnson & Nephew, Ltd., [1913] 1 K.B. 398, 410 (1912):
Where a question arises ... between parties of whom one is the owner or occupier
of the place and the other, the party injured, is not there as of right, but must
justify his presence there if he can, the law has long recognized three categories of
obligation.
7. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 58 (1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
8. See id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 329 (1965).
9. PROSSER § 58; Lygo v. Newbold, 156 Eng. Rep. 129, 130 (Ex. 1854) (Pollock, C.B.).
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other for his own convenience or pleasure, with the express or im-
plied consent of the landowner.'0 Social guests, such as Randall Camp,
fall within this traditional category. 1 The landowner owes his licensees
a duty to warn of known dangers on the premises.' 2 An invitee is one
who, upon an express or implied invitation, enters the premises of
another in connection with business concerning the owner or oc-
cupier.'8 The landowner owes an invitee the duty to inspect for any
condition or activity involving a risk of harm, and either to warn of or
eliminate such danger.14
Settled Florida law recognized the traditional hierarchy of invitees,
licensees and trespassers.15 In Post v. Lunney, however, the Florida
Supreme Court expressly enlarged the class of invitees. 16 The district
court in Camp extrapolated from the Post opinion "a trend toward the
sound view" that a standard of reasonable care under the circumstances
The landowner is obligated, however, to warn a discovered trespasser of known dangers.
See PRoss § 58.
10. See PossEt § 60. See also cases cited in note 12 infra.
11. See PROSSER §§ 60-61.
12. See PossER § 60; Bolch v. Smith, 158 Eng. Rep. 666, 670 (Ex. 1862) (Martin, B.);
Southcote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195, 1197 (Ex. 1854) (Pollock, C.B.).
13. See PROSSER § 61. In many jurisdictions, including Florida, an invitee also is one
who enters premises apparently held open to the general public. See, e.g., Post v. Lunney,
261 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1972); Black v. Central R.R., 89 A. 24 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1913).
14. See PROSSER § 61; Smith v. Steele, L.R. 10 Q.B. 125, 127 (1875) (Blackburn, J.);
Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. I C.P. 274, 286-87 (1866) (Willes, J.), aff'd, L.R. 2 C.P. 311
(1867).
15. See Byers v. Gunn, 81 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1955) (trespasser); Stewart v. Texas Co.,
67 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1958) (licensee); Cavezzi v. Cooper, 47 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1950); Goldberg
v. Straus, 45 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1950) (social guest as licensee); J.G. Christopher Co. v.
Russell, 58 So. 45 (Fla. 1912) (invitee). See also McNulty v. Hurley, 97 So. 2d 185 (Fla.
1957).
The three-tiered hierarchy has not been strictly applied to children upon the land of
another. See Burdine's, Inc. v. McConnell, 1 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 1941); Annot., 16
A.L.R.3d 25, 118-24 (1967).
16. Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146, 148-49 (Fla. 1972). Invitee status was extended to
those upon the land of another "for a purpose for which the land is held open to the
public." Id. at 148, following RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1960). But cf. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 332, 343 (1934). The original RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 329 (1934) redefined an invitee as a business visitor-that is, a person invited onto
the land in connection with business dealings between himself and the possessor of the
land. This position reflected the view held by the Reporter, Professor Bohlen, that the duty
owed to an invitee by the occupier rested on the benefit to be derived by the latter. See
Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligation in the Law of Tort, 44 AM. L. REG. (N.S.)
209, 234 n.67 (1905). The view that the status of invitee arises from a relation inuring to
the mutual benefit of both the owner and his visitor, or to the economic benefit of the
owner, was eventually accepted in Florida. See McNulty v. Hurley, 97 So. 2d 185, 188 (Fla.
1957). Cf. City of Boca Raton v. Mattef, 91 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1956); J.G. Christopher Co. v.
Russell, 58 So. 45 (Fla. 1912).
The position taken by the first Restatement and Professor Bohlen was vigorously at-
tacked in an influential article written by Dean Prosser, who, inter alia, contended that
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should be substituted for the varying duties of care owed to persons
lawfully upon the land of another.17
the early British cases did not apply an economic benefit test. See Prosser, Business
Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REv. 573 (1942). As Reporter of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, Dean Prosser was probably responsible for expanding the category of
invitees to include public invitees (members of the public invited for a purpose for which
the land is held open to the public) as well as business visitors. In Post v. Lunney, supra,
the court specifically referred to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and to Dean
Prosser's research on the matter, as the rationale for expanding the Florida definition of
invitees to include public invitees. 261 So. 2d at 148.
17. 265 So. 2d at 731. The existence of such a trend in Florida is somewhat question-
able. In fact, on its face the supreme court opinion in Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146
(Fla. 1972), represents an adjustment more than a trend. As the opinion stated:
In adopting the [public] invitation test, we adopt the older of the two rules, and
the one preferred by legal scholars and a majority of the jurisdictions in this
country. And we feel we are adopting the more realistic of the two views. The
licensee status of the social guest in the home remains unchanged as does the
status of the trespasser and the respective standards of care applicable to each.
Id. at 149 (footnotes omitted).
There is little in this language to support any extrapolation of a trend toward aboli-
tion of the separate categories of invitee, licensee and trespasser. The opinion retained the
framework of three categories while basing its adjustment on a rule which is supported by
scholars and founded in legal history and legal realism. See Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 992 (1964).
On the other hand, it might be argued that total abolition of the categories is the more
realistic view; moreover, it is a view not without support among legal commentators. See
Sideman v. Guttman, 330 N.Y.S.2d 263, 267 (App. Div. 1972) (citing authorities). Never-
theless, the movement toward total abolition is of recent origin, and hardly has won
universal acceptance among American courts. See PROSSR § 58.
As Judge Mann noted in Camp, the move away from the common law categories be-
gan in Britian. 265 So. 2d at 731. In Hawkins v. Coulsdon & Purley Urban Dist. Council,
[1954] 1 Q.B. 319, 336 (1953), Lord Denning concluded:
[N]owadays, in the case of an unusual danger which is not obvious or known to the
visitor, it can fairly be said that the occupier owes a duty to every person lawfully
on the premises to take reasonable care to prevent damage. The duty is not to in-
vitees as a class, nor to licensees as a class, but to the very person himself who is
lawfully there. What is reasonable care in regard to him depends on all the cir-
cumstances of the case.
Three years later Parliament abolished the categories by statute, imposing on all oc-
cupiers the "duty to take such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable
to see that the visitor will be reasonably safe in using the premises for the purposes for
which he is invited or permitted by the occupier to be there." Occupiers' Liability Act of
1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, § 2.
More recently, in the United States, the California Supreme Court abolished the
categories judicially. See Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968). The
court determined that a "reasonable care under the circumstances" test should be rec-
ognized as the duty owed by a landowner to all those upon his premises. While heralded
by several commentators as a leading case to be followed in other jurisdictions, the opinion
in Rowland actually turned on a reinterpretation of a civil code provision and not on a
change in the common law. See Note, Rowland v. Christian: New Protections Afforded a
Social Guest in California, 3 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 170, 175 (1968). Contra, 44 N.Y.U.L.
Rav. 426, 432 (1969). Nevertheless, Rowland has been cited and followed by several juris-
dictions. See, e.g., Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308, 314 (Colo.- 1971);
Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1972). On the other hand,
1974]
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The supreme court in Wood understood the district court to have
abolished all distinctions among the traditional categories,, but the
supreme court repudiated the existence of any "trend" toward such a
total abolition. 19 Two considerations were determinative. First, the
court observed that the district court's "reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances" standard failed to allow for the "inherent distinctions in
relationships involved between persons who come upon an owner's
property. " 20 The court feared that total abrogation of those distinc-
tions would interfere with the privacy to which a landowner is en-
titled.21 Secondly, the court concluded that a reasonable care standard
would not provide a sufficiently precise measure for a jury to apply in
all factual situations.22
Thus Wood v. Camp has, for now, precluded the abolition in Flor-
ida of the separate common law duties owed to those who enter an-
other's land.23 More significantly, however, the Wood decision does
alter the classification of invitees, licensees and trespassers as set forth
by Post v. Lunney, and provides for Florida a current definition of
each. Post expanded the category of invitee to include not only those
upon the land of another for a business purpose, but also those upon
that land "for a purpose for which the land is held open to the pub-
lic."124 Wood further enlarges the invitee class to include those who have
been extended either an "express or reasonably implied invitation" to
enter another's land.25 Thus social guests-heretofore classified as
several jurisdictions have expressly declined to follow Rowland. See, e.g., Hessler v. Cole,
289 N.E.2d 204, 206 (Ill. App. 1972) (noting the civil code basis of Rowland); Benedict
v. Podwats, 271 A.2d 417, 418 (N.J. 1970). Still other jurisdictions have rejected Rowland
by implication. See, e.g., Mion Constr. Co. v. Rutledge, 182 S.E.2d 500 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971);
Osterman v. Peters, 272 A.2d 21 (Md. 1971).
See also Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 508 (1970) (Rowland v. Christian, supra); Annot., 16
A.L.R.3d 25, 118-24 (categories abolished as to children).
18. Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. 1973). The supreme court's reading of
Camp was perhaps incorrect. See note 2 supra.
19. 284 So. 2d at 696.
20. Id. at 695.
21. Id. at 696.
22. Id. at 695. The supreme court read Camp to apply the "reasonable care under the
circumstances" test to all persons upon the land of another. This is the same test that
applies in determining the liability of a landowner to an invitee. See Post v. Lunney, 261
So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1972); J.G. Christopher Co. v. Russell, 58 So. 45 (Fla. 1912). The supreme
court's opinion in Wood reflects a fear that a jury might award an uninvited licensee, or
even a trespasser, as substantial a recovery as would be awarded to an invitee under the
same circumstances. See 284 So. 2d at 694.
23. See 284 So. 2d at 696. The court felt that abolishing the categories would prac-
tically "make the owner an insurer of those who come on his premises." Id.
24. 261 So. 2d at 148, citing REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 332 (Tent. Draft No.
5, 1960).
25. 284 So. 2d at 695.
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licensees28-now enjoy the status of invitee. This reclassification is
significant; while the homeowner formerly was bound only to refrain
from "wilfully or wantonly" injuring or exposing his social guests to
danger,2 7 he now owes them the same duty of care owed to business
visitors, namely, "reasonable care under the circumstances."
8
By expanding the class of invitees the Wood decision narrows the
category of licensees. Licensees in Florida are now only those who enter
the premises of another solely for their own convenience without either
an express or reasonably implied invitation.2 9 As the court itself
noted,30 this limited class of licensees seems to overlap the classification
of trespassers set forth in Post"' and reiterated in Wood.3 2 The Wood
decision, however, purports to leave unchanged the separate standards
of care owed to licensees and trespassers by the landowner.3 3
While the Wood court's reclassification of invitees, licensees and
trespassers is clear enough, several questions are not definitively re-
solved by the opinion. Historically, the duty of care owed to a licensee
has not been contingent upon the landowner's actual discovery of his
presence; his license to come upon the land has constituted sufficient
notice of the probability of his presence to require that he be warned
of known dangers.3 4 The duty to warn a licensee of known dangers be-
fore he is actually discovered has been the margin of protection that
the law has granted to a licensee because his presence, if not welcomed,
is at least not unexpected.3 5 A trespasser's presence, on the other hand,
cannot reasonably be anticipated; therefore he is owed no duty of
warning before actual discovery.
The Wood opinion was silent, however, on the question of whether
the duty to warn a licensee of known danger continues to attach before
his actual discovery, now that social guests have been elevated to in-
26. See Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146, 149 (Fla. 1972).
27. Id. at 147.
28. 284 So. 2d at 695.
29. 284 So. 2d at 695. Wood's differentiation between uninvited and invited licensees
(who are now invitees) is similar to Iowa's subdivision of licensess into two classes: (1) i-
censees by acquiescence and (2) licensees by express or implied invitition. See Wilson v.
Goodrich, 252 N.W. 142 (Iowa 1934); Note, The Duty Owed by Land Occupiers in Iowa,
20 DRAKE L. Ray. 159, 160 (1970). An uninvited licensee in Florida is the same as a li-
censee by acquiescence in Iowa, and is owed the same duty of care.
30. 284 So. 2d at 695.
31. 261 So. 2d at 147, quoting from 23 FLA. JuR. Negligence § 54 (1959): "[A] tres-
passer is one 'who enters the premises of another without license, invitation, or other
right, and intrudes for some definite purpose of his own, or at his convenience, or merely
as an idler with no apparent purpose, other than perhaps to satisfy his curiosity'.
32. See 284 So. 2d at 695.
33. See id. But see notes 36-44 and accompanying text intra.
34. See Gainesville & G.R.R. v. Peck, 46 So, 1019, 1022 (Fla. 1908).
95. See id.
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vitee status. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that licensees
are no longer entitled to such a warning. The duty to warn arose when
the class of licensees included those on the premises by virtue of an ex-
press or implied invitation (usually social guests) placing the land-
owner on notice of their probable presence.36 Since Wood reclassified
as invitees all those entering the premises of another in response to an
express or implied invitation,17 a rationale for the imposition of a
duty to warn remaining members of the licensee class, prior to dis-
covery of their presence, no longer seems to exist. Hix v. Billen's de-
cided soon after Wood, appears to affirm this conclusion. The Hix
court reasoned that the presence of a trespasser or uninvited licensee is
not likely to be anticipated; hence, neither is owed a warning of known
dangers until his presence is discovered.89 Citing Wood, the Hix court
added that the "limited duty' ' 40 owed to trespassers and uninvited li-




37. See 284 So. 2d at 695.
38. 284 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1973). The Hix and Wood opinions were issued only eight
days apart and are virtually companion cases. Both were written by Justice Dekle and
each cited the other. See Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 695 (Fla. 1973); Hix v. Billen,
284 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 1973). Hix imposed ordinary negligence as the standard of care
for any landowner who, by act or omission, injures a person whose presence is known to
him. Id. at 210. The holding in Hix embraces the majority rule regarding such negligence
by a landowner and expressly overrules Cochran v. Abercrombie, 118 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1960). See 284 So. 2d at 210.
39. Hix v. Billen, 284 So. 2d 209, 210-11 (Fla. 1973), stating:
There is a distinction to be noted between active, personal negligence on the
part of a landowner and that negligence which is based upon a negligent condition
of the premises. The real reason which gave rise to the limited liability to a tres-
passer or uninvited guest licensee, is not because his injury upon defendant's
premises is of any less concern as an injury, but because his presence is not likely
to be anticipated, so that the owner or occupier owes him no duty to take pre-
cautions toward his safety beyond that of avoiding willful injury and if his presence
be discovered, to give warning of any known dangerous condition not open to
ordinary observation by the uninvited licensee or trespasser. This rule relating to
the limited duty to uninvited licensees (and trespassers) continues as our basic
law with respect to an alleged negligent condition of the premises. Wood v. Camp,
284 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1973), filed October 3, 1973.
This language accords uninvited licensees significantly less legal protection than they
previously have enjoyed in Florida. See cases cited in note 51 infra. Moreover, it is dif-
ficult to understand why the Wood and Hix courts felt compelled to retain the separate
categories of "uninvited licensee" and "trespasser." Since, according to the court, the duty
of care owed to each is the same, there is no reason to distinguish between the two.
40. Presumably, the court was referring to the duty to warn discovered trespassers
and uninvited licensees of known dangers. See note 39 supra.
41. Since Wood elevates to invitee status all those with an express or implied in-
vitation to enter another's land, all remaining licensees are, by definition, uninvited i-
censees.
42. 284 So. 2d at 210-11.
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Hix v. Billen suggests that the "narrow distinctions" in Wood be-
tween trespassers and the "very limited," newly defined category of
uninvited licensee have been or will be narrowed into oblivion. Ap-
parently, after Hix, the additional protection afforded pre-Wood li-
censees48 no longer is available to that class. Thus, just as invited li-
censees are now the equivalent of invitees, it seems that uninvited li-
censees enjoy no stricter legal protection than do trespassers.4"
The Wood court felt compelled to retain the traditional categoriza-
tion of those upon the premises of another because of the "responsibil-
ity of the law to provide guidance" for juries-a responsibility that the
district court allegedly had ignored.4 However, the court hinges the
status of an intruder without an express invitation on the factual
determination of whether there was "an invitation which can be reason-
ably implied from the circumstances. '" This language provides little
more guidance for the jury than the standard of care that the district
court had proposed: "reasonable care in regard to [a person on the
premises of another] depends on all the circumstances of the case."
47
The implications of Wood and Hix may be illustrated by con-
sidering the position of a homeowner whose premises-neither held
open to the public nor used for a business purpose-contain a con-
cealed defect that causes a personal injury. Before the principal case
was decided, if the injured party was a licensee or a discovered tres-
passer the homeowner would be liable only if he had known of the de-
fect and had failed to give warning of the latent danger. Under Wood,
however, it appears that if the jury finds an invitation, express or
implied, the owner can be held liable for a condition of which he was
ignorant.48 Apparently, a host is now the insurer of the safety of his
social guests.
43. This additional protection was provided by the landowner's duty to warn licensees
of known dangers. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
44. The resulting categorization of invited and uninvited persons is similar to Mon-
tana's separation of persons on the land of another into two categories: invitees and
trespassers-licensees. See Jonosky v. Northern Pac. Ry., 187 P. 1014 (Mont. 1920); Egan v.
Montana C. Ry., 63 P. 831 (Mont. 1901); Comment, Liability for Personal Injuries Caused
by Use and Occupation of Real Estate, 30 MONT. L. REV. 153 (1969).
45. See 284 So. 2d at 694.
46. Id. at 694-95.
47. Camp v. Gulf Counties Gas Co., 265 So. 2d 730, 731 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972),
citing Hawkins v. Coulsdon & Purley Urban Dist. Council, [1954] 1 Q.B. 319, 337 (1953)
(Denning, L.J.).
48. Since those with expressed or implied invitations are now grouped with business
visitors as invitees, it should follow that a host is now obliged to search for concealed
defects in order to protect his social guests. The landowner has traditionally owed his in-
vitees the duty to inspect for conditions or activities involving a risk of harm. See note 14
and accompanying text supra. On the other hand, both Post and Wood characterized the
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Conversely, if the jury does not find an invitation, Hix and Wood
suggest that the owner cannot be held liable-even if he had full
knowledge of the condition that caused the injury. This result hardly
comports with the supreme court's professed "concern for the welfare
of our neighbor.""9 For example, the presence of door-to-door sales-
men, while usually not solicited, is not unforeseeable, and it seems un-
reasonable that Florida law will accord them no greater protection than
is provided to trespassers.5 0 While announcing a decision that purports
to impose increased duties of care upon a landowner, the Wood court
effectively has relegated uninvited licensees to trespasser status. This re-
sult is contrary not only to established Florida law,51 but also to the
overwhelming weight of authority, which imposes a duty on the land-
owner to warn all licensees of known dangerous conditions.52
When the elevation of a social guest to invitee status is considered
in isolation, an argument can well be made that "the continuing in-
roads of a crowded society" now call for the imposition of an increased
duty owed to invitees as "reasonable care," and Wood added that application of that
standard should include consideration of the following factors:
The presence upon the premises, reasonably to be expected by the owner, his
family, agents or servants, of the person who is injured; the person's purpose for
being on the premises; ... the location where he was at the time of the injury,...
together with all other evidence bearing on the duty allegedly owed and bearing
on what constitutes "reasonable care in the circumstances."
284 So. 2d at 695. It therefore appears that failure to inspect might not itself give rise to
liability, but would be one factor for the jury to consider in determining whether the
host had exercised reasonable care.
49. 284 So. 2d at 696.
50. It seems more reasonable, for example, to require a homeowner with knowledge
of a defective step leading to his front door to post a warning, in order to avoid injury
to unwary Avon ladies or Girl Scouts peddling cookies. As uninvited licensees, neither
saleswomen nor Girl Scouts are entitled to such a warning after Wood and Hix. See note
39 supra.
51. Without differentiating between those invited and those uninvited, Florida courts
in the past have required that all licensees be warned of known dangers. See McNulty v.
Hurley, 97 So. 2d 185, 187 (Fla. 1957); 1661 Corp. v. Snyder, 267 So. 2d 362, 363 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Freeman v. Hallevue, Inc., 179 So. 2d 859, 860 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1965); Banks v. Y.M.C.A., 176 So. 2d 570, 571 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
183 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1965); Jerrell v. Whitehurst, 164 So. 2d 875, 876 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1964); Wagner v. Owens, 155 So. 2d 181, 182 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
155 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1963); Crutchfield v. Adams, 152 So. 2d 808, 811 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1963); North Broward Hospital Dist. v. Adams, 143 So. 2d 355, 356 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 149 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1962).
52. Dean Prosser states:
[A landowner] may be liable if he places an obstruction in a private way or path,
or digs a hole, installs a dangerous electric wire, or sets a vicious horse where li-
censees customarily pass, or establishes or permits some similar new danger where
it may reasonably be expected that they will not discover it. The liability is based
... on the duty to give warning of a known danger.
PRossR § 60, at 382 (footnotes omitted).
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duty of care upon a social host.53 This alteration of traditional tort
doctrine means that a family extending its hospitality gratuitously may
now be liable for unknown dangers which pose as great a threat to the
host family as to its guests. 54 Moreover, relatives residing apart from the
host household now enjoy a privileged status denied residents of the
household.5 5 By making hosts as liable to their social guests as mer-
chants are to their customers, Wood pits guest against host (or, more
likely, both against an insurance company), while putting uninvited
visitors at their peril.
Criminal Law-FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-INVESTIGA-
TIVE REPORTS NEITHER SIGNED BY NOR DIRECTLY QUOTING A DECLAR-
ANT ARE NOT DISCOVERABLE "STATEMENTS" WITHIN RULE 3.220.-
State v. Latimore, 284 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert.
denied, 291 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1974).
One week after James Latimore was charged with second degree
murder, his defense counsel filed a motion for pretrial discovery of all
police reports compiled in connection with the charge. In its order
granting the motion and compelling discovery, the trial court ruled
that "all police reports are 'statements' within the meaning of Rule
3.220(a)(1)(ii), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure."' Rather than
comply with this order, the State sought review by writ of certiorari to
the Third District Court of Appeal. The Third District granted the
State's petition and quashed the trial court's order, holding that
53. See 284 So. 2d at 696. See also Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 (Mass. 1973).
54. In Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972), the head of a household,
his young daughter and her young house guest all died in their sleep from carbon
monoxide poisoning resulting from failure to maintain a gas refrigerator line. The estate
of the house guest was allowed recovery from the estate of the head of the household.
55. In Phillips v. Phillips, 287 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973), the court,
following Wood, ruled that a seven-year-old boy was an invited social guest upon the
premises of his grandfather and hence an invitee. Cf. Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d
639 (Minn. 1972), where the daughter's house guest had a cause of action against the
father but the daughter presumably did not.
1. The trial court's ruling is stated in State v. Latimore, 284 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 291 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1974).
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